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People spontaneously produce gestures during speaking and thinking. The authors focus here on gestures
that depict or indicate information related to the contents of concurrent speech or thought (i.e.,
representational gestures). Previous research indicates that such gestures have not only communicative
functions, but also self-oriented cognitive functions. In this article, the authors propose a new theoretical
framework, the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, which explains the self-oriented functions of
representational gestures. According to this framework, representational gestures affect cognitive pro-
cesses in 4 main ways: gestures activate, manipulate, package, and explore spatio-motoric information for
speaking and thinking. These four functions are shaped by gesture’s ability to schematize information,
that is, to focus on a small subset of available information that is potentially relevant to the task at hand.
The framework is based on the assumption that gestures are generated from the same system that
generates practical actions, such as object manipulation; however, gestures are distinct from practical
actions in that they represent information. The framework provides a novel, parsimonious, and compre-
hensive account of the self-oriented functions of gestures. The authors discuss how the framework
accounts for gestures that depict abstract or metaphoric content, and they consider implications for the
relations between self-oriented and communicative functions of gestures.
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People spontaneously produce gestures during speaking and
thinking. Gestures play an important role in communication
(Hostetter, 2011; Kendon, 1994), as speech and gesture jointly
express the speaker’s message in a coordinated way (Kendon,
2004; Streeck, 2009). Thus, gesture production is partly motivated
by speakers’ desire to enhance communication. However, a grow-
ing body of evidence shows that gesture production also affects
gesturers’ own cognitive processes and representations; that is,
gestures also have self-oriented functions. The goal of this article
is to outline a theoretical account of the self-oriented functions of
gestures.
Theories of embodied cognition argue that human cognitive
processes are rooted in the actions of human bodies in the physical
world (Shapiro, 2014; Wilson, 2002). According to this perspec-
tive, cognitive processes are rooted in perception and action. We
argue here that gestures are closely linked to practical actions, as
they are generated from the same system. Moreover, gestures are
physical actions of a special type, that is, representational actions.
As such, gesture is involved in cognitive processes in important
ways, which we describe herein.
There is wide agreement in the literature that gestures can be
categorized into several subtypes (Efron, 1941; Ekman & Friesen,
1969; McNeill, 1992, 2005). Most research on the self-oriented
functions of gestures focuses on representational gestures (though
see Krahmer & Swerts, 2007, on beat gestures). Representational
gestures are generally defined as gestures that depict action, mo-
tion, or shape, or that indicate location or trajectory. For example,
as a speaker says, “she throws a ball,” she might enact a throwing
motion with her hand, or as she says, “the ball hit the wall and
bounced back,” she might trace the trajectory of the ball with her
finger. Representational gestures may also metaphorically repre-
sent abstract concepts. For example, while saying “an opinion,” a
speaker might make a cup-like shape with his palm facing upward
as if to hold an object, thus metaphorically representing an opinion
as a graspable object. Representational gestures include iconic
gestures, metaphoric gestures, and deictic gestures in the taxon-
omy described by McNeill (1992), and they are roughly equivalent
to pantomimes, physiographic, ideographic, and deictic gestures in
the system described by Efron (1941). Throughout this article, we
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use the term gesture to refer specifically to representational ges-
tures.
Gesture for Conceptualization
What function do gestures serve for the person who produces
them? Existing hypotheses regarding the self-oriented functions of
gestures focus on how gestures facilitate speaking. Several distinct
hypotheses have been proposed. First, the lexical retrieval hypoth-
esis holds that speakers’ gestures serve to increase activation on
items in their mental lexicons, therefore facilitating lexical access
(Hadar & Butterworth, 1997; Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000;
Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996). According to this view, a
gesture may activate spatial features that are a part of the semantic
representation of a lexical item, and in so doing, prime retrieval of
that lexical item. Second, the image activation hypothesis (de
Ruiter, 1998; Freedman, 1977; Hadar & Butterworth, 1997) holds
that gesture maintains visuospatial imagery. Because gesture pre-
vents imagery from decaying, the speech production process has
better quality information to inspect. Third, the information pack-
aging hypothesis holds that gesture helps speakers package spatio-
motoric information into units appropriate for verbal encoding
(Kita, 2000). When communicating complex information, one
needs to break the information down into chunks of a size man-
ageable for the speech production process. One important planning
unit for speech production is the clause (Bock & Cutting, 1992);
thus, gestures help chunk information into units that can be en-
coded in a clause. Fourth, the cognitive load reduction hypothesis
(Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Wagner,
Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004) holds that gesture reduces the
amount of cognitive resources needed for formulating speech. The
scope of all of these theories is limited to speech production;
however, a growing body of literature suggests that gesture’s
function in cognition goes beyond speaking.
There is abundant evidence that gesture is involved, not only in
speaking, but also in learning and problem solving. When people
explain their solutions to problems or think aloud as they solve,
they often use gestures to highlight spatio-motoric representations
(e.g., Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) or to express spatial
strategies (e.g., Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011). Gestures
can introduce new strategies into people’s repertoires of strategies
(Goldin-Meadow, Cook, & Mitchell, 2009), bring out implicit
knowledge in problem solving (Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, &
Goldin-Meadow, 2007), and lead to lasting learning (Cook, Mitch-
ell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2008). Some researchers have argued that
gesture facilitates learning by reducing learners’ cognitive load
(Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005).
People spontaneously gesture not only when they talk about
their problem-solving processes (co-speech gestures), but also
when they solve problems silently (co-thought gestures; Schwartz
& Black, 1996; Hegarty, Mayer, Kriz, & Keehner, 2005).1 Similar
to co-speech gestures, these self-oriented co-thought gestures can
reflect problem solving strategies (Alibali, Spencer, et al., 2011)
and enhance problem solving performance (Chu & Kita, 2011).
Moreover, there is evidence that co-speech and co-thought ges-
tures are produced from the same underlying mechanism (Chu &
Kita, 2016). Here, we propose that both co-speech and co-thought
gestures have the same self-oriented functions.
We present a new theoretical framework, the gesture-for-
conceptualization hypothesis, which proposes a role for gesture in
both speaking and thinking. This new account places gesture in a
more central position in human cognition, in contrast to accounts
that focus only on the role of gesture in either language production
or problem solving. We propose that gesture shapes the way
people conceptualize information through four functions. The key
theses of the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis are (a) ges-
ture activates, manipulates, packages, and explores spatio-motoric
information for the purposes of speaking and thinking and (b)
gesture schematizes information, and this schematization process
shapes these four functions.
According to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, ges-
ture influences conceptualization in the sense that it affects the
contents of thought in four ways. First, people use gesture to
activate spatio-motoric information (e.g., Alibali & Kita, 2010).
When there is a choice between using spatio-motoric representa-
tions versus other more abstract representations for speaking or
thinking, producing gestures encourages people to rely more on
spatio-motoric representations. Second, people use gesture to ma-
nipulate spatio-motoric information (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011). Just
as people use action to manipulate objects, people can use gesture
to manipulate spatio-motoric information. Third, people use ges-
ture to package spatio-motoric information into units useful for
other cognitive operations. For example, when verbally expressing
complex ideas, information needs to be linearized into small
chunks, each of which can be verbally encoded in a clause. Gesture
facilitates this process (e.g., Mol & Kita, 2012). Fourth, people use
gesture to explore various possibilities for what information to
focus on in activities that involve rich or complex spatio-motoric
information. Finally, we maintain that the four functions depend
on gestures being schematic representations, which focus on a
small subset of information that is potentially relevant to the task
at hand (Chu & Kita, 2008; de Ruiter, 2000; Goldin-Meadow,
2015; Novack, Congdon, Hemani-Lopez, & Goldin-Meadow,
2014).
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis is based on our
view of how gestures are generated—that is, the mechanism that
gives rise to gestures. Unlike some theories that embed gesture
generation within speech production processes (e.g., de Ruiter,
2000; McNeill, 2005), we propose that gestures are generated from
the processes that also generate practical actions (e.g., grasping a
cup to drink; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kita, 2000, 2014; Kita &
Özyürek, 2003) and, therefore, gestures share some properties with
practical actions (Chu & Kita, 2016). Because thinking in terms of
action has different properties from propositional or verbal think-
ing, gesture offers possibilities and perspectives that propositional
or verbal thinking cannot, and therefore, gesture affects thinking in
particular ways.
In the following sections, we describe the evidence for each of
the four functions. We then consider how these functions are
shaped by gesture schematizing information.
In considering evidence for the role of gesture in cognition, it is
valuable to distinguish issues of mechanism and function, drawing
1
“Co-thought” gestures do not include “silent gestures” (Goldin-
Meadow & Brentari, 2016), which are produced for communicative pur-





































































































246 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
on the Aristotelian distinction between efficient cause and final
cause. Efficient cause or mechanism is the process or operation
that gives rise to a behavior, and final cause or function is the
purpose that a behavior serves, or the consequence that a behavior
brings about (see Hladký & Havlícˇek, 2013, for discussion). The
most direct evidence for self-oriented functions of gestures comes
from studies that demonstrate cognitive consequences of gesture
by experimentally manipulating gesture production (e.g., by en-
couraging or prohibiting gesture). Less direct evidence comes from
studies of the mechanisms that give rise to gestures. For example,
some studies experimentally manipulate the difficulty of cognitive
processes, and demonstrate that specific types of difficulty give
rise to more gestures. Such findings suggest that gestures may be
produced to facilitate the cognitive processes under study. Though
indirect, this type of evidence is important because it can discon-
firm hypotheses about self-oriented functions of gesture and in-
form us about what processes may benefit from gesture, comple-
menting findings from studies that experimentally manipulate
gesture production. In the following sections on the four functions
of gestures, we first briefly present indirect evidence from studies
on mechanism, and then present more direct evidence from studies
that manipulated gesture production.
Gesture Activates Spatio-Motoric Information
According to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, pro-
ducing gestures increases the activation level of spatio-motoric
information during speaking and thinking. This can occur in two
ways. First, gestures can help maintain the activation of spatio-
motoric representations that are already active, so that these rep-
resentations do not decay during speaking or thinking (de Ruiter,
1998; Hadar & Butterworth, 1997; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, &
Wheaton, 2001). Second, gestures can activate new spatio-motoric
representations—ones that were not previously active—and this
can, in turn, change the content of speech or thought (see also
Hostetter & Boncoddo, in press). Two lines of evidence, which we
review below, support these claims. First, people produce more
gestures when maintaining pre-existing spatio-motoric representa-
tions is challenging. Such findings provide suggestive but not
definitive evidence that gesture activates spatio-motoric informa-
tion. Second, as shown in studies that experimentally manipulate
gesture production, producing gestures promotes the expression
and use of new spatio-motoric information in speaking and prob-
lem solving. Such findings provide more direct, definitive evi-
dence for this function of gesture.
Difficulty in Maintaining Spatio-Motoric Information
Triggers Gesture
Several studies have shown that people produce more gestures
when it is more difficult to maintain pre-existing spatio-motoric
representation. For example, adults produce more gestures when
describing line drawings or paintings from memory than when
describing them with the stimuli visible (de Ruiter, 1998; Morsella
& Krauss, 2004; Wesp et al., 2001). Along similar lines, children
gesture more when they need to maintain spatial information in
memory, such as when asked to remember the location of a toy
(Delgado, Gomez, & Sarria, 2011).
Gesture Production Promotes Activation of
Spatio-Motoric Information
Experiments in which gesture production is manipulated—for
example, by prohibiting gesture—provide strong evidence that
gesture activates spatio-motoric information. Two types of effects
have been reported: gesture maintains pre-existing spatio-motoric
representations (i.e., helps them resist decay) and gesture activates
new spatio-motoric representations that were not previously active.
We review evidence for each of these effects, in turn.
Producing gestures maintains activation of pre-existing spatio-
motoric information. So and colleagues (2014) asked participants
to remember a route on a diagram representing streets. During the
retention period, participants rehearsed the route by silently ges-
turing or by visualizing it while holding a softball in each hand
(prohibiting hand movements). Participants recalled the route bet-
ter when they gestured than when they visualized without moving
their hands. Thus, gesture helped maintain their pre-existing rep-
resentation of the route.
Producing gestures also activates new spatio-motoric informa-
tion. When people have a choice between using spatio-motoric
versus non-spatio-motoric information, gesture production pro-
motes the use of spatio-motoric information. That is, when people
are free to choose the content of their speech, gestures activate
spatio-motoric information that were not previously active, leading
people to express more spatio-motoric content in speech. For
example, in conversational interactions, the imagistic content of
speech is greater when people are allowed to gesture than when
they are not (Rime, Shiaratura, Hupet, & Ghysselinckx, 1984);
people choose to talk about spatio-motoric content when they are
free to gesture.
In problem solving, people also rely more on spatio-motoric
information when allowed to gesture. For example, in explaining
Piagetian conservation tasks, children who are allowed to gesture
tend to invoke perceptual features of the tasks (such as the heights,
widths, or shapes of the task objects), whereas those who are not
allowed to gesture often focus on non-perceptually-present aspects
of the situation, such as the initial equality of the quantities (Alibali
& Kita, 2010). As a second example, when adults predict which
direction a specific gear in a gear configuration will move, people
who are allowed to gesture often rely on a strategy that involves
simulating the movements of the gears, whereas those prohibited
from gesturing are more likely to rely on an abstract strategy,
based on the number of gears (e.g., if the number of gears is odd,
the final gear in the row will turn in the same direction as the first
gear; Alibali, Spencer, et al., 2011). Thus, gesture helps partici-
pants to generate simulations of the gears’ movements. Taken
together, these findings suggest that gesture activates new spatio-
motoric representations, leading people to focus on spatio-motoric
information in their explanations and their solution strategies.
Gesture can also activate new spatio-motoric information when
people talk about abstract ideas, such as metaphors. Many meta-
phors are grounded in physical actions or spatial relationships
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and gesture facilitates the mapping
between these spatio-motoric concepts and their metaphorical
meanings. For example, when asked to explain the metaphorical
mappings underlying phrases such as “spill the beans” (e.g., beans
represent secrets, spilling represents dispersion of information),





































































































247HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
metaphor and in more detail when encouraged to gesture than
when prohibited from gesturing (Argyriou & Kita, 2013; Argyriou,
Mohr, & Kita, in press). Producing gestures generated spatio-
motoric information based on the literal meanings (e.g., “spill-
ing”), and facilitated participants’ mappings between the literal
concepts and the abstract meanings (e.g., “dispersion [of informa-
tion]”).
Gestures can also support abstract reasoning by activating new
spatio-motoric representations that concretize or spatialize abstract
ideas. For example, Beaudoin-Ryan and Goldin-Meadow (2014)
asked fifth graders to judge which of two choices in moral dilem-
mas (e.g., cheating vs. stealing) was worse. During their responses
to probe questions, children were either encouraged to gesture,
prohibited from gesturing, or allowed to gesture spontaneously.
Children sometimes expressed multiple perspectives in gestures,
using two-handed gestures that located two individuals in different
locations in gesture space, and they did so especially frequently in
the gesture-encouraged condition. Crucially, children in the
gesture-encouraged condition also expressed multiple perspectives
most often in their speech, followed by children in the gesture-
allowed group and then those in the gesture-prohibited group.2
Thus, when multiple perspectives could be simultaneously “spatial-
ized” in gesture, it was easier for children to incorporate multiple
perspectives in their verbal statements about moral issues. Thus,
activating spatio-motoric representations for abstract concepts via
gesture led to a shift in participants’ reasoning.
Taken together, these findings make a strong case that produc-
ing gestures activates both pre-existing and new spatio-motoric
representations, which are in turn used in speaking and thinking. In
this way, gesture can change the course of speaking and thinking.
Gesture Manipulates Spatio-Motoric Information
When speaking or solving problems, people often need to men-
tally manipulate spatio-motoric information. For example, one
might need to rearrange, translate, rotate, invert, or take a new
perspective on the objects one is speaking or thinking about.
According to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, people
can use gesture to manipulate spatio-motoric information. There
are two lines of evidence for this view. The first, suggestive line of
evidence shows that when manipulation is difficult, people pro-
duce more gestures. The second, more direct line of evidence
indicates that producing gestures improves manipulation perfor-
mance.
Difficulty in Manipulating Spatio-Motoric Information
Triggers Gesture
Suggestive evidence that gesture manipulates spatio-motoric
information comes from people’s behavior in solving spatial trans-
formation problems, such as mental rotation tasks (for an example,
see Figure 1). People spontaneously produce gestures when they
solve such problems, both when solving while talking aloud and
when solving silently (Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011; Ehrlich, Levine, &
Goldin-Meadow, 2006), and they gesture more when the problems
are more difficult (Chu & Kita, 2011). Along similar lines, people
gesture at a higher rate when describing a figure that they must
mentally rotate than when describing that same figure without
rotation (Hostetter, Alibali, & Bartholomew, 2011).
Another source of suggestive evidence comes from people
skilled at using the abacus for calculation. When calculating with-
out an abacus, skilled abacus users often produce hand movements
resembling abacus manipulation (Hatano, Miyake, & Binks,
1977), and they do so more often for more difficult problems
(Brooks, Barner, Frank, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014).
Gesture Production Affects Manipulation of
Spatio-Motoric Information
Studies in which the availability of gesture is manipulated
experimentally provide more direct evidence that gesture functions
to manipulate spatio-motoric information. Several studies have
provided evidence of this sort.
Encouraging gesture promotes an aspect of spatial skill termed
penetrative thinking, which is the ability to visualize and reason
about the interior structure of object, based on observing the
object’s surface (Atit, Gagnier, & Shipley, 2015). Penetrative
thinking requires taking a new perspective on a spatial represen-
tation; for example, geoscientists might reason about how a visible
rock outcropping extends below the surface of the earth. In Atit
and colleagues’ study, participants were asked to explain how they
would build three-dimensional versions of geologic block dia-
grams using playdough, and they described the resulting cross-
sections. Participants who were asked to use their hands as they
explained showed greater improvement on a posttest of penetrative
thinking than did participants who were asked to sit on their hands
while explaining. Thus, gesture improved participants’ internal
computation of the spatial transformations involved in creating the
structures depicted in the diagrams.
Encouraging people to produce co-thought gestures improves
their performance in mental rotation tasks. Chu and Kita (2011)
instructed participants to solve two blocks of identical mental
rotation problems while alone in a room, and without speaking. In
each problem, participants judged whether the lower object was
rotated from the upper left or the upper right object (see Figure 1).
The availability of gesture during problem solving was manipu-
lated in the first block of trials. Participants who were encouraged
2 The study has three phases (pretest, manipulation, and posttest,) but
here we focus on the results concerning the manipulation phase.
Figure 1. Two example stimuli from the mental rotation task in Chu and
Kita (2011). In the left panel, the lower object was rotated from the upper
left object 60° about the bisector of the horizontal and in-depth axes. In the
right panel, the lower object was rotated from the upper right object 240°
about the bisector of the horizontal and in-depth axes. The participant






































































































248 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
to gesture produced more gestures and solved more problems
correctly than participants who did not receive any instructions
about gesture (and who therefore produced fewer gestures) or
participants who were prohibited from gesturing. Thus, gesture
enhanced participants’ abilities to perform spatial transformations
involved in mental rotation.
In the second block, all participants were prohibited from ges-
turing while solving the same mental rotation problems. Partici-
pants who had been encouraged to gesture in the first block still
solved more problems correctly than participants in the other
conditions. Thus, gesture did not simply offload the intermediate
representation of the stimulus objects in working memory to the
hands—instead, gesture had a lasting impact, improving how
people mentally transformed spatial information. Based on their
rich experience of hand-object interaction and gestural represen-
tation of such interaction, participants could effectively simulate
the rotation of an object and the visual consequences of the
rotation, making the judgment more accurate.
Gesture also helps skilled abacus users to manipulate an imag-
inary abacus when they calculate without a physical abacus (Ha-
tano et al., 1977). When hand movements of skilled abacus users
were prohibited during mental calculation (without the abacus),
they were less accurate in their calculations. These co-thought
gestures helped abacus users mentally simulate abacus calculation,
and prohibiting such gestures made the simulation less effective.
Taken together, experimental evidence from studies of penetra-
tive thinking, mental rotation and abacus calculation support the
view that gesture functions to manipulate spatio-motoric informa-
tion.
Gesture Packages Spatio-Motoric Information
When verbally expressing complex information, a single utter-
ance or clause is often insufficient; information may need to be
distributed across multiple utterances or multiple clauses. The
information has to be packaged into units that can readily be
processed within a single processing cycle for speech production
(Kita, 2000; Alibali, Yeo, Hostetter, & Kita, in press; termed
conceptualization for speaking in Levelt’s (1989) speech produc-
tion model). In thinking and problem solving, information may
need to be packaged into units for cognitive processing, as well.
According to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, ges-
ture helps people package spatio-motoric information into units
that are appropriate and useful for the task at hand. When complex
information (e.g., the shape of a vase) is gesturally expressed, a
single gesture may not be able to express all relevant aspects of the
information, and each gesture may then focus on a particular
aspect (e.g., the shape of the opening, the contour outline from a
particular viewpoint). What is expressed by a gesture may be
determined by affordances (Gibson, 1979) of the referent (Chu &
Kita, 2016; Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2015) or by
other top-down factors (e.g., an experimental manipulation of what
to express in gestures, Goldin-Meadow et al., 2009). When gesture
selects a particular aspect of complex information, this information
chunk can be used as a unit for utterance planning or for other
forms of cognitive processing.
There are two lines of evidence that gesture helps people pack-
age spatio-motoric information. The first, suggestive line of evi-
dence shows that when information packaging is difficult, people
produce more gestures. The second, more direct line of evidence is
that producing gestures affects how information is packaged for
speaking and thinking.
Difficulty in Information Packaging Triggers Gesture
Several studies have investigated how speakers’ gesture produc-
tion varies when the difficulty of information packaging is manip-
ulated. In the earliest study of this sort (Alibali, Kita, & Young,
2000), children saw one of two identical objects being physically
transformed (e.g., water in a tall, thin glass poured into a shallow,
wide glass), as in Piagetian conservation tasks. In the description
condition, children described how the two task objects looked
different. In the explanation condition, children judged whether the
quantities were the same and explained that judgment. Information
packaging was more difficult in the explanation task because the
information expressed needed to align with the quantity judgment.
Children produced verbal utterances with comparable content in
the two conditions (e.g., “this one is tall, and this one is short”).
However, they produced gestures that represented properties of the
task objects more often in the explanation condition than in the
description condition. Thus, more difficult information packaging
triggered more gestures, even when the verbal utterances were
comparable.
Similar effects of information packaging difficulty on gesture
production have been observed in adults as well as children
(Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita, 2007; Kita & Davies, 2009; Melinger
& Kita, 2007). In each of these studies, participants described
visually presented figures, and information packaging difficulty
was manipulated by varying characteristics of the figures (see
Figure 2). In each study, it was easier for participants to decide
what information to encode in each utterance for easy figures than
for hard figures. Across all three studies, participants produced
comparable utterances for both types of figures, but they gestured
more for the hard figures than for the easy figures. Thus, more
challenging information packaging triggers gestures.
Gesture Production Affects Information Packaging in
Speaking and Thinking
Studies in which gestures are manipulated experimentally pro-
vide more direct evidence that gesture functions to package spatio-
motoric representations into units appropriate for speaking and
thinking. Two studies have provided such evidence.
When the information encoded in gesture is manipulated, infor-
mation packaging in the concurrent speech changes accordingly.
To study this issue, Mol and Kita (2012) asked participants to
describe motion events (e.g., an object rolls down the hill) that
involve both manner (e.g., roll) and path (e.g., down). In the
separate gesture condition, participants were told to produce a
gesture that depicted manner (e.g., to rotate the hand repeatedly in
one location) and a separate gesture that depicted path (e.g., to
sweep the hand diagonally downward) during the description.
In the conflated gesture condition, participants were told to pro-
duce a gesture that depicted manner and path simultaneously in a
single movement (e.g., to move the hand diagonally downward,
while rotating the hand repeatedly). Participants produced single-
clause descriptions (e.g., “it rolled down the hill”) more often in





































































































249HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
tion, and they produced two-clause descriptions (e.g., “it went
down / as it rolled”) more often in the separate-gesture condition
than in the conflated-gesture condition. Thus, changing the way
gestures packaged information changed how the information was
packaged into clauses, which are planning units in speech produc-
tion (Bock & Cutting, 1992). This finding indicates that gestural
packaging of information shapes what information is encoded in
each planning cycle for speech production (see also Kita &
Özyürek, 2003).
One other study suggests that the content of gesture shapes
information packaging for thinking. Goldin-Meadow et al. (2009)
asked children to solve math equations such as 237  _7,
and instructed them to produce gestures that encoded either a
correct problem-solving strategy (a V-shaped two-finger point at 2
and 3, and then an index finger point at the blank) or a partially
correct strategy (a V-shaped point at 3 and 7, and then an index
finger point at the blank). At posttest, children in the correct
strategy condition performed better than those in the partially
correct strategy condition, and this effect was mediated by the
extent to which strategies were expressed in speech at posttest.
That is, gesturally expressing a particular solution strategy during
the lesson helped participants to package relevant pieces of infor-
mation about equations, which they verbally expressed in the
posttest and used in solving the problems correctly.
Taken together, this experimental evidence supports the claim
that gesture functions to package spatio-motoric information, both
for speaking and for thinking.
Gesture Explores Spatio-Motoric Information
When solving a problem, one often needs to find information
that leads to a solution. The challenge is to find relevant informa-
tion among the many pieces of information that may or may not be
useful. This challenge is similar when verbally expressing complex
information; one needs to find the optimal way to encode and
integrate information, from among many possibilities.
According to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis, peo-
ple can use gesture to explore spatio-motoric information that may
be useful for the task at hand (Alibali et al., 2000; Kita, 2000).
Four lines of evidence converge to build a case for this function of
gesture. The first, suggestive line of evidence shows that difficult
tasks trigger gestural exploration. The second, more direct line of
evidence shows that people display a wider range of conceptual-
izations for problems when gesture is allowed than when it is
prohibited, suggesting that gesture helps them to explore a wider
range of options. The third line of evidence indicates that trial and
error processes, which are a form of exploration, can take place in
gesture. Speakers sometimes abandon gestures that they initiate,
and the distribution of these abandoned gestures suggests that they
are used for “trying out” ideas. The fourth line of evidence comes
from qualitative case studies demonstrating how ideas develop in
gestural “trial and error.” Speakers sometimes try out ideas in
gesture that they do not express in speech; as their utterances
unfold, speakers eventually find or create a gestural representation
that they then express in speech.
Difficult Tasks Trigger Exploration in Gesture
When exploring optimal ideas for solving a problem, the search
is more effective when covering a wider range of ideas. Gesture
can do so by “casting its net” in a different part of the conceptual
space than verbal or propositional thinking (Kita, 2000). People,
indeed, often express some information uniquely in gesture (i.e.,
not in the accompanying speech) when explaining solutions to
difficult problems. Such “gesture-speech mismatches” can occur
when children explain their solutions to equations such as
Figure 2. Stimuli from the verbal description tasks in Kita and Davies
(2009; a, b), in Hostetter, Alibali, and Kita (2007; c, d), and in Melinger
and Kita (2007; e, f), which manipulated difficulty of packaging informa-
tion for speaking. The left panels (a, c, e) are hard stimuli and the right
panels (b, d, f) are easy stimuli. For (a, b), participants described lines
contained in each rectangle, ignoring the colors. In (a), the dark lines
created gestalts that spanned across rectangles and made it difficult to
package information within each rectangle, whereas in (b), the dark lines
did not span across rectangles. For (c, d), participants described the
location of the dots, ignoring any lines. In (c), participants had to package
dots into verbalizable units, whereas in (d), the lines “pre-packaged” dots
into verbalizable units. For (e, f), participants described a route through all
circles connected by lines. In (e), participants had to decide which of two
branching routes to take first, whereas in (f) the routes were deterministic.





































































































250 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
237  __7 (Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988). A
child might express an incorrect “add all” strategy in speech (“2
plus 3 plus 7 plus 7 is 19”), and at the same time, a correct “make
both sides equal” strategy in gesture (sweeping across the left side
of the equation while saying “2 plus 3 plus 7”, and then sweeping
across the right side while saying “plus 7 is 19”; the gestures make
the same movement on both sides, expressing equality). Such
mismatches appear to reflect gestural exploration of informa-
tion—in this case, the fact that equations have two “sides”.
Gesture-speech mismatches also occur when children explain Pi-
agetian conservation tasks (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986) and
other sorts of problem-solving tasks (e.g., Pine, Lufkin, & Messer,
2004). Children produce gesture-speech mismatches especially often
when they are in a transition phase toward a more advanced under-
standing (Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Church & Goldin-
Meadow, 1986; Perry et al., 1988; Pine, Lufkin, & Messer, 2004).
Furthermore, during transitional knowledge states, children ex-
press a wider range of solution strategies in gesture than in speech
(Goldin-Meadow, Alibali, & Church, 1993), suggesting gestural
exploration of solution strategies.
Speakers explore in gestures, as manifested in gesture-speech
mismatches, more frequently when it is difficult for them to decide
what to say. As described in the previous section, Alibali, Kita, and
Young (2000) manipulated difficulty in what information to ex-
press with an explanation task (more difficult) and a description
task (less difficult). Children produced more speech-gesture mis-
matches in the explanation task than in the description task. Thus,
when it is difficult to decide exactly what information to verbally
express, people use gesture to seek potentially relevant informa-
tion.
Gesture Production Facilitates Exploration of Ideas
One way to measure how much information people explore is to
measure the number of relevant ideas that people generate when
solving problems. Studies that manipulate the availability of ges-
ture have shown that people generate a wider range of conceptu-
alizations when they produce gestures than when they do not. For
example, Broaders and colleagues (2007) investigated whether
gesturing leads to generation of more solution strategies for math-
ematical equations such as 237  __7. Children explained
how they would solve such problems, first in a set of “baseline”
problems in which gesture was not manipulated, and then in
second set of problems in which gesture was manipulated. Relative
to the baseline phase, children who were encouraged to gesture
added more new solution strategies during the second set of
problems than children who were prohibited from gesturing, and
these new strategies were almost always expressed in gesture and
not in speech. That is, gestures explored a wide range of concep-
tual possibilities.
Along similar lines, Kirk and Lewis (2016) investigated whether
children produce more creative answers in the Alternative Uses
Test (e.g., “list all nonconventional uses of newspaper”, Guilford,
1967) when gesturing. When free to move their hands, the more
children gestured, the greater the number of valid solutions they
generated. Furthermore, encouraging children to move their
hands substantially increased the number of novel uses that they
generated. These findings suggest that people used gesture to
explore possible affordances of the objects, and this exploration
allowed them to find more solutions.
Abandoned Gestures Indicate Unsuccessful Exploration
People sometimes change their minds about their gestures and
abandon them prematurely, as if exploring via trial and error in
gesture. For example, when participants described their solutions
to mental rotation problems (see Figure 3) in Chu and Kita (2008),
they sometimes stopped their gestural movements suddenly, as if
they changed their minds about what information to explore. These
stoppages occurred during the stroke phase of the gesture, which is
the expressive part of the movement, or during the preparation
phase, in which the speaker brings the hand to the starting position
for the stroke (see McNeill, 1992, and Kita, van Gijn, & van der
Hulst, 1998).
If abandoned gestures are a sign of unsuccessful exploration,
two predictions follow. First, these gestures should occur before
gestures that reflect successful exploration, that is, nonabandoned
gestures. Second, they should occur more often on hard problems
than on easy ones, because people are more likely to explore
possibilities on hard problems. A reanalysis of data from Experi-
ment 1 in Chu and Kita (2008) supported both predictions.3
First, participants usually produced abandoned gestures prior to
nonabandoned gestures within individual trials. For trials with at
least one abandoned and one nonabandoned gesture, we gave a
score to each gesture according to its position in the trial (e.g., for
a trial with three gestures, the first gesture received a score of 1 and
the third gesture received a score of 3). The mean position score
for abandoned gestures (M  1.73, SD  0.80) was significantly
lower than that for nonabandoned gestures (M 2.96, SD 1.22),
t(18)  4.97, p  .001, d  1.19.
Second, participants produced abandoned gestures more fre-
quently on harder mental rotation problems (i.e., 120° and 240°
rotation angles; M  0.92 per minute, SD  0.98) than on easier
problems (i.e., 60° and 300° rotation angles; M 0.57 per minute,
SD  0.60), t(18)  2.58, p  .019, d  0.43. Thus, task
difficulty elicits gestural exploration of information. Further anal-
yses excluded the possibility that these abandoned gestures were a
consequence of abandoned speech, in which participants corrected
or repeated their own speech (for these analyses, see the supple-
mental material).
Microgenesis of New Ideas in Gesture
If gesture functions to explore spatio-motoric information, as we
suggest, this should be reflected in the microgenesis of ideas in
gestures. That is, trial and error processes should be evident in gesture
as speakers generate utterances or approaches to solving problems,
and these processes should sometimes lead to ideas that are expressed
in speech or offered as problem solutions. Here we discuss two
examples in which gestures explore various related ideas, until even-
tually the speaker finds an idea that is appropriate for the task.
The first example (see Figure 4) comes from a speaker narrating an
animated cartoon she had just seen (data from McNeill, 1992). She is
3 This study was conducted under the ethical approval for the project
“Spontaneous gesture” (Reference number 181005153), granted by the






































































































251HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
describing a scene in which Sylvester (a cat) is running away as he
holds Tweety (a bird) in his hand, but a heavy weight, which had been
catapulted up in the air earlier, comes down on him and crushes him.
This crushing is important as it allows the story to move forward; it
makes Sylvester release Tweety, and she escapes.
In this example, the speaker explores different ways of packag-
ing the crucial information—initially representing multiple aspects
of the event (the weight flying through the air and the weight
hitting the cat), and eventually zeroing in on the hitting event,
which is most crucial to the story line. Her first gesture (Figure 4,
left panel) depicts both the weight (represented by the left hand)
flying through the air in an arc trajectory and the weight hitting the
cat (represented by the right hand). She just says “uh uhm” while
producing this gesture, presumably because the depicted informa-
tion was too complex to be verbally expressed in a single clause.
In the second gesture (right panel), she “recycled” the final part of
the first gesture, and depicted solely the hitting event. This time,
she produced a full-fledged verbal description: “he gets clobbered
by the weight.” Her two gestures explored different ways to
conceptualize the scene. It appears that a relatively small change in
the gestural representation led her to focus on the crucial hitting
event, allowing the discourse to move forward.
As a second example, consider a boy explaining his judgment to
a Piagetian task in which the experimenter poured one of two
identical, tall glasses of sand into a short, wide dish (Figure 5;
example from the dataset described in Alibali et al., 2000). The
boy claimed that the tall glass now contained more sand than the
short dish. In explaining this judgment, he began by saying
“Cause, um . . .” and pointed toward the taller glass (Figure 5,
Panel a). However, he quickly abandoned this thought about the
tall glass, and shifted his attention to the short dish, saying, “the
bowl is wi- —cause the bowl is wider.” With this utterance, he
made a V-shaped gesture with the index and middle fingers of his
left hand, and moved it down and up repeatedly at the side of the
dish, representing its width and height (Figure 5, Panel b). As he
completed this utterance, while saying the word “wider”, he
moved his hand into a claw shape over the dish, and spread and
closed his fingers (twice), representing the area of the top of the
dish (Figure 5, Panel c). Notably, the idea of spreading or area that
he expressed in this gesture goes beyond the notion of width which
he said in the accompanying speech. He then pulled his hand back
into a point toward the dish and ultimately back to his body while
saying “and it needs um. . . .” He then concluded, “it needs to fill
out.” With this final utterance, he repeated the spreading gesture,
with his hand again moving from a claw shape to a flat hand with
fingers spread (Figure 5, Panel d). With this gesture he depicted
the sand “filling out” a wider area, which occurred when the
experimenter poured the sand from the glass to the dish.
In this example, the boy explored many features of the task
objects in gesture; he (eventually) lexicalized many, but not all, of
these features. At the outset, he seemed to explore the possibility
of saying something about the tall glass, but quickly decided
against it. He then explored the width and height of the dish, with
the up-and-down V gesture at the side of the dish. He eventually
lexicalized the feature “wider”, but did not ever (in the course of
this explanation) lexicalize height (thus producing a gesture-
speech mismatch). Finally, he explored the area of the dish and the
spreading of the sand, using a spreading gesture over the dish. He
repeated this gesture a total of three times, eventually lexicalizing
it using the verb “fill out”, on the third iteration of the gesture.
Figure 3. A stimulus used in the Experiment 1 of Chu and Kita (2008).
The left object was rotated 60° anti-clockwise about the in-depth axis.
Participants’ task was to describe how the left three-dimensional object
could be rotated to the position of the right one (e.g., “Rotate it anti-
clockwise about the in-depth axis for about 60°”).
Figure 4. Gestural exploration of information during narrative (example
from the recording analyzed in McNeill, 1992). The accompanying speech
was, “uh uhm (left panel), he gets clobbered by the weight (right panel)”.
Figure 5. Gestural exploration of information during problem solving
(example from the dataset reported in Alibali et al., 2000). The accompa-
nying speech was (a) “cause um . . .”, (b) “the bowl is wi-, cause the bowl





































































































252 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
Most relevant to our point here, many of the features that he
eventually lexicalized were expressed first in gestures, and only
later in speech. We suggest that his gestural exploration of the task
objects helped him generate the idea that the sand fills out a larger
area in the dish than in the glass.
Of course, in both of these examples, one cannot infer that the
change in gesture caused the change in the speaker’s focus; it
remains possible that the gestures simply reflect rather than caused
that change. Nevertheless, these examples are important in illus-
trating how gestural exploration can unfold over time and can
influence verbally expressed conceptualizations of events or ob-
jects.
Summary of the Evidence for the
Exploration Function
In summary, several lines of evidence converge to suggest that
gesture explores information that may be useful for speaking and
thinking. The most direct evidence comes from studies that ma-
nipulated gesturing and showed when people gesture, they have
access to a wider range of ideas (Broaders et al., 2007; Kirk &
Lewis, 2016). Gestural exploration of ideas is manifested in
gesture-speech mismatches, in abandoned gestures, and in gestural
discovery of novel ideas that are subsequently expressed in speech.
The key features of these phenomena are that the microgenesis of
ideas in gesture is, to some extent, independent from (and blazing
the trail for) the microgenesis of ideas in speech, and that ideas
develop in gesture via a process of trial and error (see Goldin-
Meadow, Alibali, & Church, 1993; abandoned gestures in reanal-
ysis of Chu & Kita, 2008). When people use gestural, spatio-
motoric thinking and verbal, propositional thinking in parallel,
they cast a wider net for possible solutions (Kita, 2000). Engaging
multiple qualitatively different ways of thinking enriches the con-
ceptual resources that come into play. This argument is based on
growth point theory (McNeill, 1992), which proposes that the
interplay of two qualitatively different kinds of thinking—gestural
thinking and verbal thinking—drives the speaker’s cognitive pro-
cesses forward because more diverse ways of conceptualizing
information or framing the problem become available.
Relationship Among the Four Functions
We argue that the four proposed functions are distinct from one
another; however, they can also work together to enhance perfor-
mance. The four functions can operate simultaneously; for exam-
ple, when a speaker talks and gestures about an object that is no
longer present, a gesture may both activate and explore spatio-
motoric information about the object at the same time. Further-
more, the exploration function may be triggered by the need for
better packaging of information or by the need to manipulate
spatio-motoric information (e.g., to describe something from the
listener’s perspective).
We argue that all four functions may operate every time people
produce gestures. However, the dominant function at any given
moment may depend on what is required for the task at hand. For
example, gesture may be used to explore when novel conceptual-
izations are useful (Kita, 2000)—and gestures that manifest this
exploration are most frequent when conceptual exploration is
useful. In support of this claim, several studies have shown that
children produce gesture-speech mismatches most frequently
when they are at the cusp of understanding a task (Church &
Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Perry et al., 1988; Pine et al., 2004).
Gestures Are Generated From the Same System That
Generates Practical Action
Why can gesture activate, manipulate, package, and explore
spatio-motoric information? In addressing this question, we con-
sider the mechanism that gives rise to gesture, and its implications
for our arguments about gesture function. We argue that gesture
has these functions because it has roots in practical action. For
each gesture that indicates body movement, object shape, object
movement or object location, there is a similar practical action. For
example, a gesture that depicts holding a mug to drink is similar to
grasping a mug to drink, a gesture indicating the round shape of the
rim of a mug is similar to tracing the rim of a mug, a gesture that
tracks the path of a ball is similar to tracking the movement of a
ball by changing the direction of gaze, a pointing gesture to an
object location is similar to reaching for an object, and so forth.
Practical actions can also serve the four functions that we posited
for gestures: activating, manipulating, packaging, and exploring
spatio-motoric information. When planning an action in a physical
or virtual (imagined or simulated) environment, one needs to take
into account spatial information in the environment; for example,
when the hand reaches out to grasp a mug, the location of the mug
determines the trajectory of the hand and the shape and orientation
of the mug afford certain possibilities for grasping (Gibson, 1979).
In this sense, practical actions can activate spatio-motoric infor-
mation (see Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010, for experimental evi-
dence). The hand can grasp and manipulate an object to examine
perceptual consequences of the object’s movement; as one exam-
ple, manipulating a mug can help one visualize it from different
angles. When the hand interacts with an object, only certain
features of the object are relevant; for example, when grasping the
handle of a mug, only the size and orientation of the handle are
relevant, and when tracing the rim of a mug, only the circular
shape and size of the opening are relevant. In this sense, practical
actions can package information about an object. The hand can
also explore various possibilities for manually interacting with an
object; for example, a hand may try out various ways to interact
with a mug. Thus, practical actions and gestures serve similar
functions.
It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between practical action
and gesture when the hand interacts with an object for communi-
cation (see also Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). For example,
one may demonstrate how to use a tool by producing movements
with the tool that simulate using the tool (Clark, 1996; LeBaron &
Streeck, 2000; Streeck, 1996) or one may show how to move or
use an object by producing an empty-handed action near the object
(Novack, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). Some researchers
have distinguished between gestures and practical actions or
“functional acts”, such as picking up or manipulating an object
(Goldin-Meadow, 2003). In contrast, other researchers have ar-
gued that gestures and practical actions are functionally similar.
For example, in their analyses of teachers’ gestures, Alibali, Na-
than, and Fuijmori (2011) argued that “hold up” gestures (i.e.,
gestures that display objects by holding them up) are functionally





































































































253HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
by bringing those referents into a space where the recipient is
likely to attend (Clark, 2003). They further argued that “hold-up-
plus-action” gestures (i.e., gestures that involve holding up and
manipulating objects) are functionally similar to representational
gestures because they depict meaning through action. To illustrate,
one of the teachers in their sample was giving a lesson about
calculating the area of a triangle; as part of this lesson, the teacher
held up two identical paper triangles and moved them together to
illustrate that two triangles form a rectangle (see Figure 6).
Practical actions produced during thinking have gesture-like
properties when the hand interacts with objects for reasoning and
thinking, as well as for communication. Consider an example from
the study, described above, in which children were asked to
describe the task objects used in Piagetian conservation tasks
(Alibali et al., 2000). In one task, children were shown two
identical balls of playdough, and then the experimenter flattened
one ball into a disk. In describing the task objects, one child said,
“One’s round,” while rolling the unchanged ball around on the
table. In this example, the child’s rolling action expressed a phys-
ical property of the ball—its spherical shape—by actually manip-
ulating the ball. Along with this action, the child expressed the
spherical shape in speech with the word “round.” The child then
continued by saying, “and one’s flat,” and indicated the flattened
disk with a flat palm gesture facing down over the disk, in this
case, without manipulating the playdough. Thus, in this part of the
utterance, the child used a gesture that represented an aspect of the
object, but did not manipulate the object. In this example, object
manipulation and gesture were used in parallel parts of the same
utterance, suggesting that they are similar in a fundamental way.
Some theoretical accounts of co-speech gesture production have
proposed that gestures are generated by the same cognitive pro-
cesses that also generate practical actions. According to the infor-
mation packaging hypothesis, “what underlies a gesture is an
action in virtual [imagined] environment” (Kita, 2000, p. 170).
Similarly, the interface hypothesis (Kita, 2014; Kita & Özyürek,
2003) proposes that gestures are generated from a general-purpose
“action generator,” which determines the content of both practical
actions and representational actions, that is, gestures. The gesture
as simulated action framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) holds
that the mental representations that underlie gestures are simulated
actions and perceptual states. In addition to these theories about
co-speech gestures, the action generation hypothesis (Chu & Kita,
2016) extends the same action-based view to co-thought gestures.
These theories contrast with theories that embed gesture genera-
tion solely within speech production processes (Butterworth &
Hadar, 1989; de Ruiter, 2000; McNeill, 1992).
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis builds on the idea
that gestures are generated from the same process that generates
practical actions (cf. Chu & Kita, 2016; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008;
Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003). That is, the information
encoded in gestures is generated from the action system.
What is the evidence for this link between practical actions and
gestures? There are three primary lines of evidence. First, people
produce more gestures when they think or speak about motoric
content than when they think or speak about other content, because
thinking and speaking about such content presumably involves
simulating actions or movements in space. Indeed, people produce
more co-speech gestures when they talk about motor imagery (e.g.,
explain how to wrap a present) than when they talk about visual
imagery (e.g., describe your favorite painting) or about abstract
information (e.g., express your view on the use of a single currency
in Europe; Feyereisen & Havard, 1999). Furthermore, in object
description tasks, people produce more co-speech gestures when
they describe objects that are highly manipulable, such as a stapler,
than when they describe objects that people do not typically
manipulate with their hands, such as a fence (Hostetter, 2014;
Masson-Carro et al., 2015; Pine, Gurney, & Fletcher, 2010). This
pattern holds, even when controlling for the objects’ spatiality,
concreteness, and ability for self-produced movement (Hostetter,
2014). Moreover, when people describe manipulable objects, they
tend to produce gestures that depict the physical actions involved
in using or handling those objects (Masson-Carro et al., 2015).
Second, when talking about objects, gesture rates are also sen-
sitive to variations in the affordances of objects, even when the
content of speech does not vary with these affordances. Chu and
Kita (2016) presented participants with two images of a mug, and
described how one mug could be rotated into the position of the
other. The mugs either had smooth surfaces or had spikes on their
surfaces (see Figure 7). Participants produced more co-speech
gestures on the smooth mug trials than on the spiky mug trials,
even though the spikes were irrelevant to the task goal and thus
had no impact on the content of speech. The same effect of varying
affordances was found in co-thought gestures when participants
silently performed a mental rotation task with either smooth mugs
or spiky mugs as the stimulus objects (see Figure 8). Thus, ges-
tures were affected by the affordances of the stimulus objects in
the same way that practical actions would be affected.
Third, experience with physically manipulating objects influ-
ences speakers’ gestures. Hostetter and Alibali (2010) examined
the gestures people produced when they described information (the
dot and line patterns in Figure 2c) that they had acquired either
visually or through physical action. Participants who constructed
the patterns manually (using wooden disks)—who would therefore
Figure 6. A “hold-up-plus-action” gesture in which the speaker manip-






































































































254 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
be expected to simulate action more strongly—produced more
co-speech gestures than participants who simply viewed the pat-
terns.
Gestures about actions reflect features of the action that the
speaker has performed. Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) asked partic-
ipants to solve Tower of Hanoi problems (Newell & Simon, 1972),
which involve lifting disks off pegs and moving them to other
pegs. Participants in a physical action group solved the problems
with real objects, actually lifting and moving disks. Participants in
a computer action group solved the same problems on a computer
screen, dragging disks with the mouse from one peg to another.
When participants verbally reported how they had solved the
problems, those in the physical action group produced more co-
speech gestures with grasping hand shapes. In addition, the motion
trajectories of their gestures were more curved than those of
speakers in the computer action group. Thus, gesture reflected
features of the actions that participants had actually performed.
If gestures are generated from the same system that generates
practical action, how can we account for the fact that the contents
of speech and gesture are highly coordinated (McNeill, 1992)? We
argue that this occurs because the action generation system and the
speech production system are highly interactive. As proposed by
Kita and Özyürek (2003), the two systems can exchange informa-
tion and align their contents. Thus, the contents of concurrent
gesture and speech tend to converge.
Our hypothesis can also explain cases in which the contents of
speech and gesture are not fully aligned. In some cases, speakers
provide more specific information in gesture than in speech. For
example, a speaker might produce a swiping gesture while saying
“cleaning the room”. In other cases, speakers express information
in gestures that they do not express at all in the accompanying
speech. As one example, the boy in Figure 5 indicated the taller
glass in gesture (Panel a), and also depicted the height of the
shorter dish in gesture (Panel b), but he never expressed these
pieces of information in his spoken explanation. When it is ad-
vantageous for gesture to explore information possibly relevant to
the task at hand, the pressure to semantically align speech and
gesture may be relaxed, and speakers may produce gestures that
are not redundant with speech (Kita, 2000). Thus, our framework,
in which speech and gesture are generated interactively in separate
processes, is compatible with both semantic integration of speech
and gesture (e.g., Kita & Özyürek, 2003; McNeill, 1992), and
systematic weakening of this integration (e.g., Church & Goldin-
Meadow, 1986).
Gesture Goes Beyond Practical Action by
Schematizing Information
Although gestures are closely linked to actions, there is a critical
difference between gesture and action: namely, gestures are rep-
resentational. Gestures represent the world; in most cases, they do
not influence, alter, or directly affect the physical world (Novack
& Goldin-Meadow, 2016). Thus, gestures are somewhat “re-
moved” from action—they schematize actions, rather than repre-
sent actions veridically (see Annett, 1990).
Because gestures are representational, one might expect that
gestures would have less influence on thought than actions. How-
ever, evidence to date points in the opposite direction: gestures
have a more powerful influence on thought than actions do.
We argue that gesture’s powerful influence on thought is a
consequence of its ability to schematize. This schematization is a
form of abstraction—that is, it strips away some elements, while
maintaining others. In this section, we first present evidence that
gestures affect thought more strongly than actions do. We then
make the case that these effects are due to gesture’s ability to
schematize information. We then discuss how gestural schemati-
zation shapes the four functions of gesture.
Gestures Affect Thought More Strongly Than
Actions Do
Four lines of evidence converge on the conclusion that gesture
can affect thinking more strongly than actions. First, gesture has a
stronger influence on solvers’ representations of problems than
action does. Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) asked partici-
pants to solve Tower of Hanoi problems with real disks and to
explain their solutions. During the explanation phase, participants
either verbally explained their solutions with gestures (the gesture
group) or physically moved the disks to illustrate their solutions
(the action group). All participants later solved Tower of Hanoi
problems with real objects again, with half of the participants in
each group using the original set of disks (the no-switch condition)
and the other half using disks whose weights had been switched so
that the smallest disk was heaviest and the largest disk was lightest
(the switch condition). The weight change affected how people’s
Figure 8. Two stimulus displays used to elicit co-thought gestures (Chu
& Kita, 2016): The smooth condition (left panel) and the spiky condition
(right panel). Participants’ task was to judge silently whether the lower mug
was rotated from the upper left or the upper right mug. In this example, the
lower mugs were rotated from the upper left object 60° around the bisector of
the horizontal and vertical axes. Note that only one side of the mugs was
painted blue, and the blue patch does not go all the way around the mugs. See
the online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 7. Two stimulus displays used to elicit co-speech gestures (Chu &
Kita, 2016): The smooth condition (left panel) and the spiky condition
(right panel). The mugs in the left panel were highly graspable, whereas the
mugs in the right panel were less graspable. Participants’ task was to
describe the rotation of the mug (e.g., “The mug on the left side of the
screen was rotated 60° backwards around the horizontal axis”). See the





































































































255HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
hands were involved in the solution: the heaviest disk had to be
moved using two hands, whereas the lightest could be moved using
one hand. Participants in the action group were not affected by the
weight switch; their solution times were similar in the two condi-
tions. In contrast, participants in the gesture group took longer to
solve the problem in the switch condition than in the no-switch
condition. This finding suggests that gesturing about actions ex-
erted a stronger influence on how action-relevant information was
mentally represented than actually performing the actions. Put
another way, weight information was incorporated into the sche-
matized spatio-motor representations (one-handed vs. two-handed
movement) that participants constructed in the gesture condition,
so the shift in weight was more problematic for them.
Second, gesture facilitates encoding of spatial information more
so than practical actions do. So, Ching, Lim, Cheng, and Ip (2014)
familiarized participants with a diagram showing a spatial route.
They then removed the diagram and asked participants either to
rehearse the route with hand gestures in the air (the gesture group),
to draw the route on a piece of paper (the action group), to
mentally visualize the route without moving their hands (the
mental-simulation group), or to read aloud some random letters
(the no-rehearse group). All participants were then asked to recall
the route verbally. Participants in the gesture group recalled more
steps correctly than did participants in the action group (and those
in the gesture and action groups did better than those in the other
two groups). These results suggest that producing gestures was
beneficial for participants’ encoding of critical spatial information
about the routes. Put another way, gesture schematized key infor-
mation from the routes, leading to robust and durable memory for
that information.
Third, gestures have been found to facilitate generalization of
mathematical strategies more than actions do. Novack and col-
leagues (2014) presented children with mathematical equations
(e.g., 294  __4) on a white board, with the numbers
covered by matching number magnets. All of the children were
then asked to repeat the explanation, provided by the experimenter,
that both sides of the equation needed to be equal. Along with this
speech, children were asked to produce actions or gestures. In the
action condition, children were asked to pick up the magnetized
numbers 2 and 9 from the left side and move them into the blank
on the right side. In two gesture conditions, children were asked
either to mimic the actions described in the action group but
without physically moving the numbers (termed a “concrete ges-
ture”), or to point with the fingers of one hand to the two digits on
the left side and then point to the answer blank (termed an
“abstract gesture”). In a subsequent test phase, children in both
gesture conditions performed better than those in the action con-
dition in solving equations with a different structure (i.e., with the
blank in a different position). Further, children in the abstract-
gesture condition performed better than those in the other condi-
tions in solving equations without a repeated addend (e.g.,
253  __6). Thus, children who produced gestures were
more successful than children who performed actions in general-
izing the knowledge they gained in the training phase to solve
structurally different problems, and the benefits were greatest for
those children whose gestures were more schematic. Novack and
colleagues concluded that gestures promoted a deeper understand-
ing of mathematical equivalence by focusing attention on relevant
aspects of the equations and abstracting away from irrelevant
aspects.
Fourth, abacus experts can calculate faster without an abacus
than with a physical abacus, and their calculation is less accurate
if they are prohibited from gesturing when they calculate without
an abacus (Hatano et al., 1977). Thus, gestures allow abacus
experts to use schematized spatio-motoric information for efficient
and accurate calculation. Calculation is slower with a physical
abacus because the physical objects impose constraints that are not
relevant to computation (e.g., beads need to move a particular
distance).
To summarize, gesture can affect cognition more strongly than
practical actions. Gesture can leave a stronger memory trace than
physical action, both for properties of manipulated objects
(Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) and for visually presented
routes (So et al., 2014). Furthermore, gesture promotes learning of
problem-solving strategies that are generalizable to new situations,
more so than practical actions (Novack et al., 2014). In some cases,
gesture also manipulates spatial representations (e.g., for abacus
calculation) more efficiently than practical actions (Hatano et al.,
1977).
Key Differences Between Action and Gesture
There are several key differences between practical action and
gesture. First, gesture is always representational (it stands for
something else; Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016), but action is
not always so. On this basis, gesture may influence other repre-
sentations, such as verbal thought, spatial memory, and problem-
solving strategies, more strongly than action (see, e.g., Novack et
al., 2014; So et al., 2014). Second, gesture is usually free from the
physical constraints that practical actions are subject to. This
makes gesture more flexible than action in what it represents and
how it represents than action. Third, gesture usually does not leave
a physical trace, but practical action often does. Physical traces
may help reduce working memory load, but they may also con-
strain how malleable the representation is. Finally, and most cru-
cially, gesture schematizes information. We argue that schemati-
zation affects mental representations in specific ways that shape
the four functions, and we discuss this issue in the following
section.
Why Do Gestures Affect Thought More Than Actions?
Why does gesture exert a more powerful influence on thought
than action itself? One possibility, proposed by Goldin-Meadow
and Beilock (2010), is that gestures are not tied to real objects, as
actions are. According to this view, when gesturing, people cannot
rely on the affordances of the objects to direct their gestures; they
must instead actively create and maintain spatio-motoric represen-
tations of objects in their working memory. In contrast, when
people act on real objects, the sensorimotor details required for
action can be embedded in or off-loaded to the environment.
Therefore, relative to actions, gesture forces people to create richer
internal representations of the objects and to build stronger links
between body movements and thinking. This account can explain
why, in the Tower of Hanoi task, gesturing leads people to repre-
sent the weights of the disks, which are not relevant to the task,





































































































256 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
Meadow, 2010; see also So et al., 2014 for a similar view).
However, it is difficult for this account to explain gesture’s ad-
vantage in generalizing strategies (Novack et al., 2014).
To explain gesture’s advantage over practical action, we argue
that gestures enrich thinking via a process of schematization.
Schematization involves deleting or stripping away some elements
of a representation, and maintaining others. Gesture schematizes
actions and perceptual states, and this schematization facilitates
cognitive processing in three main ways.
First, as Goldin-Meadow (2015) has argued, schematization
facilitates generalizing knowledge to new contexts. This occurs
because schematic gestural representations omit concrete details of
actions and action-related features of objects. In this way, sche-
matization helps people focus attention on essential elements, and
neglect irrelevant details that are tied to specific actions or objects
(Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). This schematization makes it
easier to transfer the represented information to new contexts
(Novack et al., 2014).
Second, schematization makes processing of task-relevant in-
formation more efficient. Schematized information is “light-
weight” and free from physical constraints. This makes it more
efficient to use the representations, as indicated by studies of route
memory (So et al., 2014) and mental abacus (Hatano et al., 1977).
Third, schematization allows representations to be flexible and
open to change. Schematized representations can be adjusted to
become leaner or richer, as suited to the task or context at hand.
This modifiability is partially a consequence of schematized in-
formation being light-weight and free from physical constraints.
Evidence for this characteristic comes from a study of the micro-
genesis of co-thought gestures during mental rotation (Chu & Kita,
2008). This study showed that the contents of co-thought and
co-speech gestures themselves changed over trials: gestures shed
task-irrelevant information and became less physically bound to
the visual stimuli as participants gained more experience with the
task. A similar pattern has also been observed in gear movement
prediction problems (Schwartz & Black, 1996) and in the qualita-
tive analysis of the microgenesis of ideas in gestures presented in
Figure 4. The speaker’s gestural representation of the cartoon
scene evolved from one that contained too much information for
felicitous verbalization, to one with an appropriate amount of
information for verbalization.
Schematized gestural representations can also be elaborated, as
needed for the task at hand. For example, when solving gear
movement prediction problems, people often have difficulty un-
derstanding that a gear system with an odd number of gears
arranged in a circle will not move, because the gears will “jam”
(Spencer, 2003). When people fail on problems with configura-
tions that jam, they sometimes enrich their gestural representations
of the problems, adding more details about the gears’ movements,
in order to reason through how the gears will move. Because
gestural representations are flexible and modifiable, they can be
adapted to be richer or leaner, depending on the solver’s needs at
that moment in time.
When considering the consequences of schematization, it is
important to consider what information gesture sheds and what
information it retains. There is no evidence, to date, that gesture
“intelligently” selects information useful for the task goal (un-
less participants are asked to imitate a gesture that is designed
to do so, as in Novack et al., 2014, and Goldin-Meadow et al.,
2009). Indeed, gesture sometimes retains information that is not
useful for the task goal. For example, when telling a story based
on an animated cartoon, speakers commonly produce gestures
that depict motion events in the cartoon. Speakers reproduce the
left-right direction of motion with high accuracy in gesture
(e.g., when depicting a protagonist moving to the left in the
cartoon, speakers tend to make gestures that move to their left),
even though speakers never linguistically encode left-right di-
rection in this description task, because it is not relevant to the
story (Kita & Özyürek, 2003). Thus, basic parameters of visual
experience may be retained in gesture, even when they are
irrelevant to the task goal, because the gesturing hand has to
move in space. Similarly, basic parameters of actions on objects
that are irrelevant to the task goal may be retained in gestures
(e.g., whether a disk was moved with one hand or two hands in
the Tower of Hanoi task; Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). In
general, gestural schematization reduces information, but it
may also retain some spatio-motoric information that is not
relevant or useful for the task at hand.
Gestures schematize information in specific ways; thus, the
extent to which gestural schematization is useful for a given task
depends on the match between the nature of that schematization
and task goals. For example, gestures may schematize the move-
ment of an object in three ways: (a) tracing the trajectory with a
point, (b) by moving the hand along the trajectory with a hand-
shape that represents some aspects of the object or the surface
(which supports the object), and (c) the hand depicting grasping of
the object (Chu & Kita, 2008; Sekine, Wood & Kita, 2016).
Gestures may schematize an object also in three ways: (a) tracing
its outline, (b) moving the hands as if to touch (sculpt) the object
surfaces, and (c) using handshape to represent the shape (e.g., a flat
hand to represent a flat object; Masson-Carro et al., 2015; Müller,
1998). Focusing only on the trajectory of object movement and
abstracting away the object shape may be useful when describing
rotation of the object, as in Figure 3. However, if the task depends
crucially on the details of the shape of a moving object (e.g., in the
game, Tetris), such schematization may not be helpful. In fact, it is
not easy for a gesture to represent both the movement and shape of
an object in detail at the same time. Thus, the benefits of gesture
may be limited for tasks that require both details of movement and
details of shape. More generally, the benefits of gesture may be
especially large when the way gestures schematize information
happens to be useful for the task at hand.
How Schematization Shapes the Four
Functions of Gestures
The schematic nature of gestural representation shapes the four
basic functions of gesture in particular ways. In all cases, infor-
mation reduction plays a key role.
First, let us consider the role of schematization in the acti-
vation of spatio-motoric information. When thinking about a
stimulus or an event, there are often many different sorts of
information one could focus on, and one must, by necessity,
focus on some aspects and neglect others. In this sense, encod-
ing inherently involves some form of schematization or strip-
ping away of details. We argue that producing gestures helps
maintain spatio-motoric information, rather than non-spatio-





































































































257HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
gesture involves movement in space. For example, when al-
lowed to gesture in solving a gear movement prediction task,
people focus more on the movements of the gears (a spatio-
motoric aspect of the stimulus) than on the number of gears in
the array (a non spatio-motoric aspect of the stimulus, Alibali,
Spencer, et al., 2011). We argue that the action of producing
gesture may lend additional activation to spatio-motoric aspects
of a representation of a stimulus or event, or it may actually
create new spatio-motoric representations, de novo. This puts a
focus on spatio-motoric aspects of situations, stripping away
other aspects.
Next, let us consider manipulating spatio-motoric informa-
tion. Manipulating images or ideas (, e.g., rotating, altering,
inverting, or taking a different perspective) requires one to zero
in on and analyze the spatio-motoric information that is relevant
to that transformation, and schematization via gesture enables
this focus and analysis. In addition, manipulating information
places a heavy load on working memory, especially if one must
keep track of every detail. If an image or idea is schematized
into a more “light-weight”, less complex, more stripped-down
representation, it will require less working memory to manip-
ulate (see Koedinger, Alibali, & Nathan, 2008, for discussion of
this issue). Thus, gesture facilitates the manipulation of ideas
because schematization via gesture reduces the amount of in-
formation to be processed.
For the same reason, schematization is also relevant to pack-
aging spatio-motoric information into units for speaking. Not
all of the elements of complex visuospatial events, scenes, or
objects can be simultaneously captured in a single utterance or
in a single step in a reasoning process; instead, one must focus
on an appropriate, relevant subset of elements at a time—
specifically, a subset that is suitable for speaking or thinking.
Thus, in the same way that a schematized representation is more
suitable for mental manipulation than a richly detailed repre-
sentation, a schematized representation is more suitable for
packaging into units or chunks for speaking or thinking.
Finally, schematization is also involved in exploring the
space of possibilities for speaking or thinking. People use
gesture to explore different ways of conceptualizing a situation.
Because gesture schematizes information, this search is effi-
cient and effective. That is, schematization via gesture reduces
the amount of information being considered at any given mo-
ment. This “distilled” information can be more easily focused
on and evaluated for its relevance to the current goal. For
example, in thinking about a conservation of liquid quantity
task, a child faces a rich array of sensory information about the
task objects, from which gesture might schematize the heights
of the containers, the widths of the containers, the pouring of
the liquid, or any of a number of other features. Each of these
features may be relevant for making a judgment and providing
an explanation. Producing gestures can help to convert this rich
array of information into a unique landscape of possible sche-
matizations; exploring these schematized possibilities is effi-
cient and may readily lead to novel ideas and solutions. For
example, the child in Figure 5 seems to have generated the
notion of area in gesture, and he eventually focused on this
schematization of the task object in his verbal explanation.
Discussion
Summary of the Claims
We have considered how co-speech and co-thought representa-
tional gestures influence gesturers’ mental representations and
processes in speaking and thinking. We proposed the gesture-for-
conceptualization hypothesis. First, representational gesture—in-
cluding both co-speech and co-thought gesture—shapes the ways
we conceptualize information through four basic functions: gesture
activates, manipulates, packages, and explores spatio-motoric in-
formation for the purposes of speaking and thinking. Second, the
schematic nature of gestural representation shapes these four func-
tions. By schematizing spatio-motoric information for these four
functions, gesture facilitates cognitive processing and generates
novel ideas, strategies and solutions that are easy to process,
adaptable, and generalizable.
To understand these functions of gesture, it is important to
consider how gesture is related to practical actions. We take the
position that representational gestures are generated by the same
process that also generates practical actions (Kita, 2000; Kita &
Özyürek, 2003). That is, gesture is a representational use of the
action generation system (see also Chu & Kita, 2016; Hostetter &
Alibali, 2008; Hostetter & Boncoddo, in press; Novack & Goldin-
Meadow, 2016). Because gesture originates in the action system,
gesture can influence thoughts about spatio-motoric information,
based on our bodily experiences in perceiving and interacting with
the world, and about abstract information, via the metaphorical use
of spatio-motoric information. However, gesture differs from prac-
tical actions in an important way: Gestures are schematic repre-
sentations (Chu & Kita, 2008; de Ruiter, 2000; Novack et al.,
2014). Because of schematization, gestural representations (a)
focus on essentials and neglect specific details, which facilitates
generalization to new contexts (Goldin-Meadow, 2015), (b) can be
processed efficiently, because representations are light-weight and
are not bound to physical constraints, and (c) are flexible and
modifiable, and therefore easy to adapt to the current goal. These
features of gestural schematization make the activation, manipu-
lation, packaging and exploration processes more effective and
efficient. That is, schematization via gesture focuses on spatio-
motoric information, stripping away other types of information
(activation), makes it possible to efficiently modify representations
(manipulation), focuses on small chunks of spatio-motoric infor-
mation appropriate for speaking and thinking (packaging), and
creates a unique landscape in which information can be explored
(exploration).
Relations to Other Theories of Gesture Production
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis is based on the
assumption that gesture originates from a general-purpose action
generator. This assumption aligns with claims made in a number of
previous theoretical proposals (e.g., Hostetter & Alibali, 2008;
Kita, 2000, 2014; Kita & Özyürek, 2003) and in empirical work
(e.g., Chu & Kita, 2016; Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009; Feyereisen &
Havard, 1999; Hostetter, 2014; Hostetter & Alibali, 2010; Pine et
al., 2010). This view contrasts with theoretical proposals that
assume that co-speech gesture originates from a subprocess of






































































































258 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis goes beyond pre-
vious accounts of the self-oriented functions of gestures in impor-
tant ways. The hypothesis unifies disparate existing accounts of
how gesture affects speaking. Furthermore, it provides a unified
account for how gesture influences both speaking and thinking,
with special attention paid to co-thought gesture. Moreover, it
proposes four functions for both co-speech and co-thought ges-
tures, and it specifies how gestural schematization of information
shapes these four functions. Thus, the proposed framework pro-
vides a novel, parsimonious and comprehensive theory of the
self-oriented functions of gestures. In this section, we illustrate
how the proposed four functions relate to existing proposals on
self-oriented functions of gestures.
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis proposes that ges-
ture activates spatio-motoric information. This function relates to
two existing accounts of the self-oriented functions of co-speech
gestures. First, some researchers have argued that co-speech ges-
tures maintain imagery during linguistic encoding (de Ruiter,
1998; Wesp et al., 2001). The activation function in the current
proposal essentially encompasses the image maintenance hypoth-
esis, in that the image maintenance function is narrower than the
activation function. According to the image maintenance hy-
pothesis, gesture simply boosts the activation of pre-existing
imagery. In contrast, the activation function in the gesture-for-
conceptualization hypothesis allows gesture both to boost activa-
tion of pre-existing spatio-motoric representations and to generate
spatio-motoric representations that would not have existed other-
wise (see Hostetter & Boncoddo, in press, for a similar view). That
is, gesture can change the content of thought by generating new
spatio-motoric representations.
Second, some researchers have argued that co-speech gestures
facilitate the retrieval of words from the mental lexicon (Hadar &
Butterworth, 1997; Krauss et al., 2000; Rauscher et al., 1996). For
example, Krauss and colleagues (2000) suggested that spatial or
motoric features expressed in gesture may cross-modally prime the
equivalent features in the speaker’s semantic representation of a
word, making that word more highly activated and consequently
more accessible. The proposed activation function is compatible
with some versions of the lexical retrieval hypothesis. Specifically,
the activation function of gesture may boost activation for spatio-
motoric features, which in turn, via a process of spreading activa-
tion, could activate words that are strongly associated with those
features.
Note that Krauss et al. (2000) proposed that gesture facilitates
lexical retrieval when gesture activates spatio-motoric features of
the semantic representation of a word. According to this view, a
gesture indicating a round shape could not facilitate retrieval of the
word cake because “Round is not a semantic feature of the word
cake” (p. 272). In contrast, according to the gesture-for-
conceptualization hypothesis, if roundness is strongly associated
with the concept of cake, then the gesture should facilitate the
retrieval of the word “cake” via spreading activation. Put another
way, according to the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis,
gestural facilitation of lexical retrieval may be a down-stream
effect of gesture activating spatio-motoric representations. This
perspective provides a potential interpretation for the inconsistent
findings in the literature regarding gestural facilitation of lexical
retrieval—Frick-Horbury and Guttentag (1998) and Pine, Bird,
and Kirk (2007) reported evidence that gesture facilitates lexical
retrieval, but Beattie and Coughlan (1999) did not. It may be that
in some cases, participants’ gestures did not activate spatio-
motoric features that were strongly associated with target words in
the word retrieval tasks, so they did not facilitate lexical retrieval.
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis also proposes
that gesture manipulates spatio-motoric information. This idea
stems from our interpretation of evidence that producing gestures
facilitates mental rotation performance (Chu & Kita, 2011), mental
abacus performance (Hatano et al., 1977), and penetrative thinking
(Atit et al., 2015). No existing theories have proposed this func-
tion.
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis also proposes that
gesture packages spatio-motoric representations for thinking and
speaking. This idea builds on the information packaging hypoth-
esis that has been put forward for co-speech gesture, and that has
received extensive empirical support (Kita, 2000; Alibali, Kita, &
Young, 2000; see Alibali, Yeo, et al., in press, for a review). The
current proposal extends this idea to thinking more generally,
encompassing findings from both co-speech and co-thought ges-
tures.
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis proposes that ges-
ture explores spatio-motoric information. The idea stems from
Kita’s (2000) interpretation of speech-gesture mismatches, as a
part of the explanation of how gesture searches for information in
the context of the information packaging hypothesis. The current
proposal further develops this idea, based on new empirical find-
ings.
The four functions posited by the gesture-for-conceptualization
hypothesis may also explain evidence that co-speech gesture light-
ens the cognitive load of speaking (e.g., Goldin-Meadow et al.,
2001; Pouw, De Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). The
most direct evidence for this idea comes from studies in which
speakers explain their solutions to mathematical equations, either
with or without gesturing, while maintaining verbal or visual
information in working memory (Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow,
2012; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Marstaller & Burianova,
2013). Participants recall the verbal or visual information better
when they gesture during the explanation task. It is possible that
gesture reduces cognitive load as a down-stream effect of the four
functions of gestures identified in the current proposal. That is, the
explanation task may have been made easier because gesture
activated, manipulated, packaged or explored spatio-motoric in-
formation, and consequently more resources were available for the
memory task.
We argue that we need exactly these four proposed functions
(not more, not fewer) to explain all the relevant findings in the
current literature. However, in this regard, we need to consider
two, related issues. First, gesture’s impact on cognition can be
described at different levels of analysis. We have characterized the
functions of gesture at a behavioral level; however, other ap-
proaches may describe functions at other levels, such as at the
neural level (e.g., stimulating neural processes in one of the cere-
bral hemispheres; Argyriou et al., in press). There may be other
levels of analysis, yet to be identified, at which gesture’s functions
can be described. Second, the four proposed functions can have
“down-stream” benefits on other cognitive processes in various
ways. For example, consider the well-documented benefits of
gesture for learning. It has been proposed that gesture facilitates





































































































259HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
sentations (Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005). In this vein, gesture
may facilitate learning by facilitating the processing of spatio-
motoric information relevant to learning. Learning may especially
benefit from gesture’s exploration function, in light of the flexible
and malleable nature of schematic gestural representation. Produc-
ing gestures can help learners to discover new conceptualizations
of problems and to change their problem representations.
The gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis holds that the
schematic nature of gestural representation shapes the four func-
tions of gestures in specific ways. First, schematization facilitates
the generalization of knowledge to new contexts. This role of
schematization has been discussed by Novack et al. (2014) and
Goldin-Meadow (2015). The other two roles—making processing
more efficient and making representations more flexible and open
to change—are novel proposals.
Gestures About Spatio-Motoric and Abstract Concepts
With Which We Have No Direct Bodily Experience
Gestures often depict physical events with which we have no
direct experience, such as movements of molecules (Stieff, 2011)
or tectonic plates (Singer, Radinsky, & Goldman, 2008). Does our
theory apply to such gestures, despite our claim that gestures are
generated from the processes that generate practical actions? We
argue that it does. The action generation process can plan gestural
movements in the “virtual environment” (p. 165) that are created
as imagery, as well as ones in the physical environment (Kita,
2000). When molecules or tectonic plates are imagined as manip-
ulable objects, the gesturing hand may move as if to grasp and
move these objects (Singer et al., 2008; Stieff, 2011). We do not
see any fundamental differences between such gestures and ges-
tures that move as if to grasp and move real objects; thus, our
theory should apply to both types of gestures.
Gestures can also metaphorically express abstract concepts
(Cienki & Müller, 2008; McNeill, 1992); for example, the flow of
time can be gesturally expressed as movement in space (e.g.,
Alibali & Nathan, 2012; Kita, Danziger, & Stolz, 2001), the
magnitudes of numbers can be gesturally expressed via the relative
spatial locations of fingers or hands (e.g., Weinberg, Fukawa-
Conolly, & Wiesner, 2015), and having an idea can be gesturally
expressed as holding an imaginary object in the hand (e.g., Kita, de
Condappa, & Mohr, 2007). We argue that our theory also applies
to metaphoric gestures. Because metaphoric gestures depict loca-
tion, motion and action in schematic ways, just as nonmetaphoric
gestures do, it is parsimonious to assume that these two types of
gestures are generated by the same mechanism and that they have
the same functions.
Many metaphors link abstract concepts to concrete, spatio-
motoric concepts that are based on the way our body physically
interacts with the environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff &
Núñez, 2000; Johnson, 1987). Metaphoric gestures regularly ex-
press such spatio-motoric source concepts (see Alibali & Nathan,
2012; Núñez & Marghetis, 2014). They can be seen as represen-
tational hand movements, acting in the “virtual environment”
(Kita, 2000, p. 165), just like the gestures about molecules and
tectonic plates mentioned above. Therefore, like nonmetaphoric
gestures, metaphoric gestures should affect abstract concepts by
activating, manipulating, packaging and exploring their underlying
spatio-motoric representations. In fact, as reviewed above, there is
evidence that metaphoric gestures activate spatio-motoric repre-
sentations of abstract concepts (Argyriou & Kita, 2013; Argyriou
et al., in press; Beaudoin-Ryan & Goldin-Meadow, 2014). We
suggest that our theory applies to both metaphoric and nonmeta-
phoric gestures, though further empirical studies are needed.
When Do Gestures Hinder or Facilitate?
To make predictions about whether gesture will be helpful or
harmful on a given task, relative to not gesturing or relative to
action, one must consider the fit between the task goals and the
kind of schematic spatio-motoric representations that gesture is
adept at activating or generating. To illustrate this point, let us
consider cases in which gesture hinders or facilitates problem
solving. As discussed above, in gear movement prediction prob-
lems, producing gestures inhibits solvers’ progression to a more
abstract strategy based on whether the number of gears is even or
odd (Alibali, Spencer, et al., 2011). Participants were less likely to
find this parity-based strategy, which is more efficient, when they
were allowed to gesture, as compared to when they were prohib-
ited from gesturing. In contrast, when solving mental rotation
problems, producing gestures led to better performance than not
producing gestures (Chu & Kita, 2011). We argue that, if strategies
based on schematic spatio-motoric representations created by ges-
ture are appropriate or efficient for the task at hand, gesture should
facilitate performance; if not, gesture may actually hinder perfor-
mance.
Relationship Between Co-Speech Gestures and
Co-Thought Gestures
One key claim of the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothe-
sis is that both co-speech and co-thought gestures are generated
from the same system that generates practical action. This claim
is supported by parallel findings for these two types of gestures.
First, people produce co-speech gestures more frequently when
speaking is more challenging, and they produce co-thought
gestures more frequently when problem solving is more chal-
lenging (e.g., for co-speech gestures: Kita & Davies, 2009;
Melinger & Kita, 2007; Hostetter et al., 2007; Rauscher et al.,
1996; Wesp et al., 2001; for co-thought gestures: Chu & Kita,
2011). Second, people produce both co-speech and co-thought
gestures more frequently when talking or thinking about stim-
ulus objects that afford action more strongly, compared to
talking or thinking about objects that afford action less strongly
(Chu & Kita, 2016; Hostetter, 2014; Masson-Carro et al., 2015;
Pine et al., 2010). Third, there are parallel changes in co-speech
and co-thought gestures over the course of learning to solve
problems. In a mental rotation task, the representational content
of both types of gestures changed from more object-anchored
forms to less object-anchored forms over time, both when
people solved the problems while speaking aloud and when they
solved them silently (Chu & Kita, 2008). Fourth, suppressing
gestures can lead to less frequent use of problem-solving strat-
egies that involve simulating physical movements of objects,
and this pattern holds for both co-speech and co-thought ges-
tures (Alibali, Spencer, et al., 2011). Fifth, people who produce
co-thought gestures more frequently also produce co-speech





































































































260 KITA, ALIBALI, AND CHU
these parallel findings from diverse paradigms and diverse tasks
support the claims that both types of gestures originate from the
same system and that they function in similar ways.
It should be noted that the co-thought gestures discussed in this
article do not include a special type of communicative “silent
gestures” that people produce when they are required to describe
objects, scenes or events in gesture without speech (e.g., Goldin-
Meadow & Brentari, 2016; Goldin-Meadow, So, Özyürek, &
Mylander, 2008; Özcaliskan, Lucero, & Goldin-Meadow, 2016).
These silent gestures are produced to replace speech and to fulfill
communicative functions; the form of these silent gestures is
largely shaped by communicative demands. According to Goldin-
Meadow and Brentari (2016), these communicative silent gestures
often have sign-language-like properties, and they are discrete in
form, with each gesture representing a word-like unit. These
communicative silent gestures are qualitatively different from the
co-thought gestures discussed in this article, which serve primarily
self-oriented rather than communicative functions. It remains an
open question what self-oriented functions such communicative
“silent gestures” may serve.
Relationship Between Self-Oriented and
Communicative Functions of Gestures
In this article, we have focused on the self-oriented functions of
gesture; however, it is undeniable that gesture, especially co-
speech gesture, also plays a role in communication (Hostetter,
2011; Kendon, 1994; Streeck, 2009). We agree with the view in
the literature that the self-oriented and communicative functions of
gesture are not mutually exclusive (Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001;
Driskell & Radtke, 2003; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007); indeed, the
very same gestures that contribute to activating, manipulating,
packaging, and exploring spatio-motoric information may also
communicate such information to others.
There are two ways in which people express themselves through
gestures: Speakers can “give” or “give off” information (Goffman,
1956) in gestures. In the former case, speakers deliberately encode
information in gestures to be received by the recipient. In the latter
case, speakers express information in gestures without deliberate
communicative intent, but the information is nevertheless taken up
by the recipient. In both cases, gestures may serve both commu-
nicative and self-oriented functions.
Giving information in gesture is apparent when a speaker stra-
tegically chooses to communicate some information via gesture.
Speakers may index their gestures verbally (e.g., “it was shaped
like this”) or they may simply use gestures that convey rich (and
relevant) information not expressed in speech. Hostetter and Ali-
bali (2011) suggested that speakers who have spatial skills that
outstrip their verbal skills may be especially likely to use gestures
in this way, allowing gesture to do much of the work of commu-
nicating. Speakers also give information in gesture when they are
directed to do so, such as in experimental settings in which an
experimenter instructs participants to produce certain gestures
(e.g., Novack et al., 2014; Mol & Kita, 2012). Such deliberate
gestures influence the gesturers’ learning (Novack et al., 2014) and
their syntactic packaging of utterances (Mol & Kita, 2012); that is,
these gestures serve self-oriented functions in both speaking and
thinking.
Giving off information in gesture is apparent in children’s
spontaneous gesture during their explanations of Piagetian conser-
vation tasks. As in Figure 5, when explaining a judgment in a
liquid quantity task, a child might explore the height, width, and
cross-sectional area of the container in gestures, but focus only on
width and area in his verbal response. The child’s teacher might
detect the information about height that the child expresses
uniquely in gesture—thus, the child’s gestural exploration may
communicate to the teacher what is “on his mind,” even though the
child did not produce it with intention to communicate (see
Goldin-Meadow, Wein, & Chang, 1992, for evidence that adults
do detect information children express uniquely in gesture in
conservation tasks). The teacher might even go on to adjust his or
her ongoing interaction with the child to take that information into
consideration (see Alibali, Flevares, & Goldin-Meadow, 1997).
Thus, these gestures clearly “give off” information. At the same
time, these gestures serve self-oriented functions. When the avail-
ability of gestures is manipulated, children’s verbally expressed
reasoning is affected (Alibali & Kita, 2010).
To summarize, gestures can simultaneously serve both self-
oriented and communicative functions—and this holds, regardless
of how strong or explicit the communicative motivation for gesture
production is.
Role of Schematization in Communicative
Functions of Gesture
We argue that the schematic nature of gestural representation
not only shapes the self-oriented functions of gesture, but also
influences how the recipient schematizes the situation at hand.
That is, speakers’ gestures can help their interlocutors to schema-
tize the relevant information from a complex spatial display—and
this can occur for spatial displays that are physical or virtual.
One setting in which this regularly occurs is in classrooms,
where teachers often use gesture to help students schematize
material in appropriate ways. For example, consider a middle-
school mathematics teacher providing a lesson about slope and
intercept (example drawn from the teacher described in Alibali et
al., 2013). In this lesson, the teacher had graphed three equations
(y  4x, y  2x, and y  2x15) all on the same graph; note that
two of these lines share the same slope (2), and two share the same
intercept (0). At this point in the lesson, the teacher wished to
highlight for his students that the slopes of two of the lines were
the same. He said, “Take a look at these two equations,” (referring
to the equations represented by the lines) while producing a
gesture that schematized the parallelism—that is, the identical
slopes—of the two lines (depicted in Figure 9). Note that the
teacher could have pointed to the intercepts of the two lines or to
some other point along their length, or he could have gestured to
the lines in some other way that did not encode their parallelism.
But, the key point at this moment in the lesson was the fact that the
two lines had the same slopes, and this parallelism was what he
chose to schematize in his gesture. Moments later, the teacher said,
“They run parallel to each other” while producing a similar gesture
in neutral space (facing toward the students), in this case, further
schematizing the parallelism of the lines, away from the specific
instance depicted on the graph. In our view, teachers’ schematizing
gestures implement a form of instructional “concreteness fading”





































































































261HOW GESTURES INFLUENCE THINKING AND SPEAKING
use gesture to guide students to focus only on crucial properties of
a visual representation (those depicted in gesture) and to ignore
extraneous details (in this case, the other line on the graph, the
intercepts of the lines, the axes of the graph, and so forth). Thus,
we suggest that teachers’ gestures schematize for students what is
most relevant at that moment in the unfolding discourse of the
lesson. Although we do not have data on what the students in this
lesson gleaned from the teacher’s “parallel” gesture, we argue that,
in general, speakers’ gestures have the potential to influence, not
only their own schematization, but also their listeners’ schemati-
zation of the topic at hand.
Indeed, research on children’s language learning demonstrates
that speaker’s gestures can affect listeners’ schematization of an
object or event. Mumford and Kita (2014) investigated this process
by having an adult speaker use a novel verb (“Look! She is
blicking”) as children watched a video scene in which a hand
moved objects in a particular way (pushing strips of cloth) into a
particular configuration (vertical stripes). The novel verb was
ambiguous between two possible referents: acting on objects in a
particular manner (pushing) or causing the end state (making
vertical stripes). When the adult accompanied the novel verb with
a gesture that highlighted the manner of action, children inter-
preted the verb as characterizing manner; when the adult accom-
panied the novel verb with a gesture that highlighted the end state,
children interpreted the verb as referring to making the end state.
Thus, when learning a novel verb while watching a complex scene,
children used the speaker’s gestures to schematize the scene in
their effort to find the referent of the novel verb. The speaker’s
gesture helped children to schematize the scene by focusing on
only one aspect of the scene. Children who saw different gestures
(with speech perfectly controlled) schematized the scene in differ-
ent ways, and this led them to make different inferences about the
referent.
We suggest that speakers’ gestures play a role in listeners’
comprehension that is similar to the role of diagrams and other
schematic representations in problem solving. Diagrams schema-
tize and make explicit spatial aspects of problems; highlighting
such elements has consequences for how problems are solved (e.g.,
Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993; Butcher, 2006; Kang, Tversky, &
Black, 2015). In the same way, speakers’ gestures schematize
spatio-motoric aspects of the topic at hand, and highlighting such
elements has consequences for listeners’ understanding.
To summarize, gestures promote specific ways of schematizing
in people who see those gestures. We argue that speakers’ gestures
foster appropriate ways of schematizing complex information in
their listeners, and that this is one of the key ways in which gesture
contributes to communication.
Conclusion
People spontaneously produce gestures both when they speak
and, in some cases, when they think silently. Though gestures,
especially co-speech gestures, can play important roles in commu-
nication, they are not a mere “output system,” which simply
externalizes pre-existing mental representations by means of body
movements. Instead, we argue that gesture has important self-
oriented functions. To explain gesture’s self-oriented functions, we
have presented the gesture-for-conceptualization hypothesis,
which holds that (a) gesture activates, manipulates, packages and
explores spatio-motoric information for the purposes of speaking
and thinking, and (b) gesture schematizes information, and this
schematization process shapes these four functions. These claims
are based on the assumption that gesture is a representational use
of the general-purpose action generation system, which also gen-
erates practical actions. Furthermore, according to the gesture-for-
conceptualization hypothesis, gesture’s influence is not confined to
speaking and reasoning about spatio-motoric information, but also
extends to abstract domains via metaphoric gestures. Finally, ges-
ture’s influence is not limited to speakers; speakers’ schematiza-
tion of information in gesture influences listeners’ thinking, as
well. In these ways, gesture plays a central role in human cogni-
tion.
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